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HIPAA Hypocrisy and the Case for Enforcing
Federal Privacy Standards Under State Law
Daniel J. Oatest
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has a right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, a Midwestern banker used his position on a county health
board to gain access to the protected medical records of individuals in his
community. 2 Using this data, he discerned which members of the com-
munity were suffering from various diseases.3 He then cross-referenced
the information with records from his bank and subsequently called due
4the mortgages of anyone suffering from cancer.
In 1995, the daughter of a hospital employee took a list of phone
numbers of patients who had recently visited the emergency room. 5 In
what she later described as a "prank," she used the information to call
several of the patients to tell them they had contracted AIDS, when in
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1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 73-74, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
2. Marianne Lavelle, Health Plan Debate Turning to Privacy: Some Call for Safeguards on
Medical Disclosure. Is Federal Law Necessary? NAT'L L.J., May 30, 1994, at Al.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Hospital Clerk's Child Allegedly Told Patients that they had AIDS, WASH. POST, March 1,
1995, at A17.
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fact they had not.6 Family members had to restrain one of the prankster's
victims from killing herself when she heard the news.7
These stories underscore the increasing importance of personal in-
formation privacy as consumers, financial institutions, and healthcare
providers confront the mounting problems associated with security
breaches. 8 Patients' fears are far from negligible, as sixty-seven percent
of Americans report being concerned about the privacy of their personal
health information. 9 Another fifty-two percent were concerned that their
health information might be used by an employer to limit job opportuni-
ties; this represents a forty-four percent increase from a similar survey
only six years ago.10 In that survey, nearly twenty percent of respondents
believed they had been victimized by an improper disclosure, 11 and ap-
proximately half of those individuals believed that the disclosure resulted
in personal embarrassment. 12
In 1996, responding to these outrageous stories and mounting pub-
lic concern, Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA, or the "Act"). 13 The Act creates national stan-
dards for the retention, storage, transmission, and exchange of personal
healthcare information. 14 The new law replaces a menagerie of state and
federal laws which had been ineffectually cobbled together to protect
healthcare information. 15 The Act also delegates authority to the
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. In 2003, 9.91 million Americans were victimized by identity theft, resulting in $47.6 billion
in losses and 297 million lost hours of productivity. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IDENTITY THEFT
SURVEY REPORT 7 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf. These
figures do not include consumers' out-of-pocket expenses to fix these costly mistakes, nor do they
include the non-economic damages that occur because of these security breaches. Id.
9. LYNNE BISHOP ET AL., CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND., NATIONAL CONSUMER HEALTH
PRIVACY SURVEY 2005, at 1 (2005), http://www.chcf.org/documents/ihealth/ConsumerPrivacy2005
ExecSum.pdf.
10. Id.
11. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, MEDICAL PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
SURVEY 15 (1999), http://www.chcf.org/documents/ihealth/topline.pdf.
12. Id. at 16.
13.42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2000).
14. Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 261, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2000)).
The relevant portion of the statute provides as follows: "It is the purpose of this subtitle to im-
prove.., the efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system, by encouraging the development
of a health information system through the establishment of standards and requirements for the elec-
tronic transmission of certain health information." Id.
15. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW § 6.5 (1996) ("As a
result of this patchwork approach [to privacy protection], individuals face an often bewildering
search through state legal code to determine the extent to which they have enforcement rights."); see
also Robert J. Moses, Privacy Actions and HIPAA: Using the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act to Protect Patient Privacy, 1216 PRACTICING LAW INST., CORP. LAW & PRAC.
HANDBOOK SERIES 513, 519-25 (2000) (discussing federal privacy regulations prior to enactment of
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Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to promulgate standards
so that healthcare providers may transmit confidential health information
electronically.16 However, the ease and efficiency of electronic transmis-
sion has only exacerbated concerns about the security of health informa-
tion. 1 7 To address these concerns, Congress included penalties in the Act
for wrongful disclosure of protected health information.' 8
On its face, the statute seemingly provides powerful protections for
individuals whose information is wrongfully disclosed.1 9 Potential penal-
ties include fines of up to $250,000 and ten years in prison.20 However,
judicial and administrative interpretations of the statute have all but
gutted the privacy provision, making it essentially a dead letter.21 Courts
have consistently denied a private right of action to consumers against
individuals who wrongfully disclose or obtain their private information.22
Instead, courts force patients to rely on a complaint-investigation process
administered by the Office of Civil Rights (OCR). However, OCR only
investigates the actions of healthcare providers and does nothing to com-
pensate patients injured by wrongful disclosures. 23 Consequently, indi-
viduals who have their HIPAA privacy rights violated have few, if any,
options to seek a remedy.
This Comment argues that patients and privacy rights advocates
should avoid direct litigation under the HIPAA statute. Instead, plaintiffs
should focus their efforts on applying the standards mandated by the
statute to the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion. Protecting
HIPAA and comparing California and New Hampshire's approach to patient privacy rules); Paul M.
Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 VAND. L. REv. 295, 310-24 (1995)
(discussing the various state and federal laws protecting patient privacy prior to the enactment of
HIPAA).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2000).
17. See Symposium, Balancing Communal Goods and Personal Privacy Under a National
Health Information Privacy Rule, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 5, 8 (2002) ("One of the main reasons that
Congress desired privacy protection was its concern about the proliferation of electronic health in-
formation."); see also Schwartz, supra note 15, at 300, who argues:
[A]ny changes in the health-delivery system are likely to increase the use and sharing of
health care information. Medical data processing will be increasingly relied upon to help
reduce waste and fraud, and to increase the efficiency of both the practice of medicine
and the payment process. This data processing will raise new threats to the specific pri-
vacy interest of patients in informational autonomy.
Id. (citation omitted) See also William H. Minor, Identity Cards and Databases in Health Care: The
Need for Federal Privacy Protections, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 253, 257 (1995) ("[M]edical
record databases pose a serious threat to the privacy rights of Americans.").
18.42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2000).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See discussion infra Part III, IV.A.
22. See sources cited infra note 118.
23. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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personal health information has become too important for further delay.
Until Congress fills the gaps in HIPAA's privacy protections by enacting
uniform comprehensive privacy legislation, state courts should use their
interpretive powers to apply the standards mandated by HIPAA to the
common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion.
Part II of this Comment summarizes the background of the HIPAA
statute as an attempted solution to the privacy problem described above,
including its legislative history and HHS promulgation of administrative
rules. Next, Part III addresses the agency-imposed limitations on the
scope of the statute. The Secretary's decision to rely solely on an admin-
istrative complaint process, combined with the government's narrow in-
terpretation of the statute granting third parties immunity from penalties,
has undermined enforcement of the privacy provision. Accordingly, Part
IV discusses previous attempts to circumvent the administrative limita-
tions by creating a private right of action and the reasons these attempts
have failed. Finally, Part V argues for a new approach, utilizing the
common law tort of inclusion upon seclusion. This approach incorporates
the benefits of a private right of action with the standards of the privacy
provisions in the HIPAA statute.
II. CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DEVELOPMENT OF HIPAA PRIVACY RULES
HIPAA is the congressional response to the need for a uniform na-
tional policy regarding the administration and distribution of healthcare
information.24 By creating uniform standards for the transmission and
exchange of healthcare information, both physically and electronically,
Congress sought to increase the quality of healthcare and the efficiency
of the national healthcare system.25 The Act was not a minor undertaking
and industry experts estimated that the cost of developing the regulatory
scheme would be quite substantial.26 The privacy provision in the statute
was included in response to concerns that the Act would substantially
24. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg.
59,918, 59,920 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160-64) [hereinafter
SPIIHI]; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
25. SPIIHI, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,920.
26. See Meredith Kapushion, Comment, Hungry Hungry HIPAA: When Privacy Regulations
Go too Far, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483 (2004). "HHS estimated that the HIPAA start up costs of
compliance are $3.5 billion with continued annual costs of $1.6 billion." Id. Conservative estimates
peg the long-term costs of implementation between $25 and $30 billion, not including hidden costs
that always occur with the creation of a new regulatory scheme. Id. But see Peter A. Winn, Confi-
dentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617,
680 (2002) ("[H]igh cost estimates associated with the HIPAA Privacy Rules appear to be due sim-
ply to the exponential growth in the use of electronic health information by the healthcare industry
without a concomitant investment in compliance with previously existing duties of confidentiality.").
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27increase the ease of access to confidential healthcare information. Due
to the complexity of the administration of healthcare information, and the
potential for unintended consequences if the rules were overly broad,
Congress created very general standards for accountability and punish-
ment.z8 To address the lack of specificity in the Act, Congress requested
recommendations for further changes from the Secretary of HHS.29
When Congress did not act on those recommendations, HHS started over
and created a new framework for the HIPAA privacy protections. 30 Pur-
suant to the congressional mandate, HHS spent three years accumulating
public comments and other recommendations for the implementation of
the final set of rules.3' The task pitted the business goal of efficient use of
healthcare technology against the privacy concerns expressed by indi-
viduals and other advocacy groups.32 In response to the agency's request
for public commentary on its proposed rules, more than 52,000 com-
ments were received.33 The resulting regulations promulgated by the
agency purport to maintain strong protections for the privacy of
27. See sources cited supra note 17.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2000). The statute provides in relevant part:
(a) Offense
A person who knowingly and in violation of this part-
(1) Uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier;
(2) Obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an individ-
ual; or
(3) discloses individually identifiable health information to another person,
Shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Penalties
A person described in subsection (a) of this section shall-
(I) be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both;
(2) if the offense is committed under false pretenses, be fined not more than
$100,000, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both; and
(3) if the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer, or use individually
identifiable health information for commercial advantage, personal gain, or
malicious harm, be fined not more than $250,000, imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both.
Id.
29. Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264(a), 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2
(2000)). The relevant portion of the statute provides as follows: "(a) In general.-Not later than
[August 21, 1997] the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall submit to [Congress] detailed
recommendations on standards with respect to privacy of individually-identifiable health informa-
tion." Id.
30. Id. § 264(c)(1).
31. SPIIHI, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160-64).
32. See Angela Stewart, HIPAA-An Attempt to Protect Individually Identifiable Health
Information, 28-JUN WYO. LAW. 26 (2005)(citing SPIIHI, 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,182-83).
33. SPIIHI, 67 Fed. Reg. at 53,182.
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individually identifiable health information.34 However, the practical ap-
plication of the rules has left much to be desired.35
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LIMITATIONS HAVE UNREASONABLY
DILUTED THE PRIVACY RULE BY NARROWLY
CONSTRUING THE SCOPE OF THE STATUTE
Although the statute and regulations appear to contain some teeth,
HHS curtailed any bite in the privacy rules by narrowly interpreting the
scope of the statute in two ways. First, HHS limited enforcement of the
privacy provision to an administrative complaint process in lieu of pri-
vate citizen suits. 36 The Secretary decided to rely on administrative en-
forcement in order to emphasize voluntary compliance with the new
regulatory scheme.37 The deadline selected for complete compliance was
April 14, 2003, nearly seven years after the enactment of the original
HIPAA statute by Congress. 3 8 At that time, enforcement rules took effect
and individuals could begin filing complaints.39 Since implementation of
the complaint process, the system has proved unworkable. 40 HHS dele-
gated authority over investigations and sanctions to OCR,41 and although
consumers filed 22,664 complaints between April 2003 and September
2006, OCR investigated only 5,400 complaints, and imposed no civil
penalties. 42 In addition, although OCR has referred over three hundred
complaints to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for further investigation
and potential criminal charges,43 to date there have been no trials
34. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500-34 (2004).
35. See infra Part III.
36.45 C.F.R. § 160.306 (2004).
37. Stewart, supra note 32, at 29; see also HIPAA Administrative Simplification; Enforcement,
70 Fed. Reg. 20,224, 20,226 (Apr. 18, 2005) ("[HHS is] committed to promoting and encouraging
voluntary compliance with the HIPAA rules .... ).
38. SPIIHI, 66 Fed. Reg. 12,434 (Feb. 26, 2001) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160-64).
39. Id.
40. See infra note 42.
41. Office for Civil Rights; Statement of Delegation of Authority, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,381 (Dec.
28, 2000).
42. Less than 25% of Medical Privacy Complaints Merit HHS Investigation, Melamedia Semi-
nar Reveals, BUS. WIRE, Dec. 13, 2006. In addition, of the 5,400 complaints investigated, OCR
dismissed approximately 1,700, or 31%, finding no violation. HHS defends its lackluster record of
enforcement by arguing that the agency has used informal means to correct complaints about privacy
deficiencies. Bob Sullivan, Health Care Privacy Law: All Bark, No Bite?, RED TAPE CHRONICLES,
Oct. 24, 2006, http://redtape.msnbc.com/2006/10/two years ago w.html#posts. See also HIPAA
Administrative Simplification; Enforcement, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,224, 20,228 (Apr. 15, 2005) ("[Section
160.312] provides that where noncompliance is indicated [by a complaint], the Secretary will at-
tempt to resolve the matter by informal means ... ) (emphasis added). However, this does not ad-
dress the agency's refusal to investigate nearly 75% of the complaints it receives.
43. Health Information Privacy/Security Alert, Melamedia L.L.C., http://melamedia.com/
shopsite-sc/store/html/hipaintro.html.
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resulting in a conviction, 44 only two guilty pleas,4 5 and two recent in-
dictments. 46 Although the pleas may seem to be a step in the right direc-
tion, HHS's subsequent policy change, discussed below, has tempered
the apparent victories.
47
Second, based on an opinion written by the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC), HHS limited penalties for improper disclosures to healthcare
providers and their immediate business associates.48 Had this policy
change been in effect at the time of the first plea, the defendant would
have been exempt from liability. 49 The OLC opinion addressed whether
the criminal penalties described in 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 apply "only to
covered entities (healthcare providers), or whether [they apply] to any
person who does an act described in the provision, including, in particu-
lar, a person who obtains protected health information in a manner that
causes a covered entity to violate the statute or regulations." 50 Ulti-
mately, the opinion interpreted the statute narrowly.5 1 As a result, parties
who are not healthcare providers, but who deceive such providers into
44. Id.
45. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Gibson, No. CR04-0374RSM, 2004 WL 2237585
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2004); Acceptance of Plea of Guilty, Adjudication of Guilt and Notice of
Sentencing, Gibson, No. CR04-0374RSM, 2004 WL 2188280 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2004); see also
Press Release, Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Texas, Alamo
Woman Convicted of Selling FBI Agent's Medical Records (Mar. 7, 2006) (on file with the United
States Department of Justice) (announcing the conviction by plea agreement of a woman charged
with selling confidential medical information), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/txs/releases/
March2006/060307-Ramirez.pdf.
46. Indictment, United States v. Ferrer, No. 06-60281 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/fls/PressReleases/Attachments/060908-01 -Indictment.pdf.
47. See OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SCOPE OF ENFORCEMENT UNDER 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/hipaa final.htm [hereinafter OLC
OPINION]. The memorandum, authored by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) at the request of HHS,
argues that the HIPAA rules apply solely to health care providers that improperly disclose protected
health information and not to third parties that cause such improper disclosures. Id. Although the
memorandum is not binding on courts, it is binding on federal prosecutors, thereby foreclosing any
possibility that the government will bring criminal charges against third parties who cause a health-
care provider to improperly disclose protected information. See discussion infra Part III.B; but see
Peter A. Winn, Criminal Prosecutions Under HIPAA, 53 U.S. ATT'YS' BULL. 21 (2005) (arguing
that although the memorandum prohibits federal prosecutors from enforcing the Act against anyone
other than health care providers, other criminal statutes operating in conjunction with HIPAA may
still provide an avenue for prosecution of third parties), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
eousa/foia readingroom/usab5305.pdf.
48. OLC OPINION, supra note 47 (distinguishing unrelated third parties from corporations
affiliated with healthcare providers on "general principles of corporate criminal liability.").
49. Simone Handler-Hutchinson, Is the Worst Yet to Come? HHS and the Courts are Finally
Talking about HIPAA Enforcement, 181 N.J. L.J. 1089, 1089 (2005) ("The [OLC] opinion appears to
undercut the Gibson conviction."); see also Winn, supra note 47, at 23 ("As a practical matter, the
OLC Opinion forecloses the use of Section 1320d-6, [HIPAA's criminal provision] for the prosecu-
tion of anyone other than a fairly narrow group of entities.").
50. OLC OPINION, supra note 47, at 4.
51. Id. at 13.
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disclosing information, are not subject to the Act.52 Despite potentially
egregious conduct by a third party, the OLC's interpretation of the statute
leaves the government powerless to impose any penalties under
HIPAA.53
A. Limiting Enforcement to an Administrative Complaint Process in Lieu
of a Private Right ofAction has Undermined the Statute
There are two central problems arising out of the government's de-
cision to limit enforcement of the privacy provision to an administrative
complaint process. First, the government cannot be a zealous advocate
for patient privacy rights because it lacks the requisite self-interest.
54
Second, the high cost of administrative enforcement limits effectiveness
55of the privacy provision because it promotes inefficient processes.
The first problem arises because the government lacks any discern-
able self-interest in prosecuting offenders. As a result, government
prosecutions necessarily turn an adversarial issue into an investigatory
matter. 56 Consequently, despite flagrant intrusions on personal privacy,
an administrative agency does not have the same economic 57 or politi-
cal 58 incentives as the victim to prosecute the offender. In a classical
economics example, although those who fraudulently obtain protected
information may reap immense gains, government regulators receive the
same compensation regardless of the outcome. 59 Political pressures
coming from within the government may also influence agency decision-
52. See id.; but cf ATLANTIC INFORMATION SERVICES, CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST
INDIVIDUALS PROCEED DESPITE DOJ MEMO (2006), http://www.aishealth.com/Compliance/Hipaa/
RPPHIPAACasesProceed.html (arguing that healthcare providers will be punished for the inten-
tional misconduct of their employees, even when the provider has acted appropriately at all times
and that any prosecution of a covered entity in these circumstances would be an injustice).
53. See OLC OPINION, supra note 47.
54. See sources cited infra notes 56-62.
55. See sources cited infra notes 63-68.
56. Historically, the American system of jurisprudence has shied away from an investigatory
model of judicial oversight. See J.A. JOLOWITZ, ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 180 (2000) ("It is for the
parties to allege in their pleadings the facts on which they rely, and this must continue to be the rule:
No one wants the judge to have a completely uncontrolled roving commission of inquiry.").
57. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of
Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1974).
58. Environmental activists have long debated the disadvantages of government enforcement in
lieu of private citizen suits. See, e.g., David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Tri-
angular Federal System. Can Three Not be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority is Shared by the
United States, the States, and Their Citizens, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1653 (1995) ("[C]itizen en-
forcement is not subject to the political pressures that might hinder state enforcement."); see also
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 126 (2001) (arguing that private suits are a far more
powerful deterrent to improper conduct than any governmental regulatory process).
59. Becker & Stigler, supra note 57, at 3-4.
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making.60 For example, since the creation of the final privacy rules, the
Bush administration has de-emphasized the importance of protecting the
privacy of personal information. 61 Executive pressure deterring agency
enforcement is particularly disturbing considering the substantial impact
that decreased enforcement has on individual rights.62
The second problem is the cost of the complaint process. This prob-
lem arises because administrative enforcement is subject to efficiency
problems.63 The government lacks adequate resources to detect and
prosecute all the potential violations of the law.64 By contrast, individuals
are in the best possible position to discover when a violation occurs and
are best able to balance the potential benefits and costs of filing suit.
65
60. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL.
L. REV. 185, 191 (2000) ("[P]olitical considerations and institutional structure may often lead agen-
cies to ignore violations that are known and appropriate to prosecute.").
61. See, e.g., HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, FIRST ANNUAL HIPAA PRIVACY CHECK-UP: BUSH
ADMINISTRATION FAILS THE AMERICAN PUBLIC (2004), http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr doc/
HPP's 1st AnnualHIPAAPrivacyCheck-Up.pdf ("The Department of Justice [DOJ] ...re-
cently issued subpoenas for women's medical records as part of its enforcement of the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act passed by Congress in 2004 .... [T]he DOJ argued that 'individuals no longer
possess a reasonable expectation that their histories will remain completely confidential."'). See also
COMMISSION ON SYSTEMIC INTEROPERABILITY, ENDING THE DOCUMENT GAME: CONNECTING AND
TRANSFORMING YOUR HEALTHCARE THROUGH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 117 (2005) (recom-
mending the creation of a Federal Privacy Standard that would, unlike the current version of the
HIPAA statute, preempt all state privacy laws, including those offering greater privacy protections
than the federal law). Cf James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets US. Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al (revealing an ongoing government program to wiretap
phone calls entering or exiting the United States without a warrant); Eric Lichtblau, White House
Denies Switch in Mail Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at A6 (discussing a presidential statement
that postal inspectors may open mail without a warrant).
62. See generally Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding that "there may be some
duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing
affect the interest of individuals, the discharge of which, the President cannot in a particular case
properly influence or control.").
63. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expand-
ing the Role ofAdministrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 107 (2005); see also Steven D. Shermer,
The Efficiency of Private Participation in Regulating and Enforcing the Federal Pollution Control
Laws: A Model for Citizen Involvement, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 461,463 (1999) ("Only by utilizing
the resources and zeal of private citizens can federal regulators achieve a more efficient and effective
balance .... ).
64. Cf Thompson, Jr., supra note 60 (arguing that the enforcement wing of federal and state
environmental agencies are woefully understaffed and underfunded).
65. Stephenson, supra note 63, at 107. Stephenson argues the following:
Effective enforcement requires the detection of violations, and private parties-especially
those who are directly affected by a potential defendant's conduct-are often better posi-
tioned than the public agency to monitor compliance and uncover violations of the law.
Affected private parties may also sometimes be better at weighing the costs and benefits
of bringing an enforcement action.
Id. See also Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J. ON
REG. 167, 189 (1985) ("A private enforcer, [as opposed to public enforcer], will have the correct
incentives to enable the evolution of efficient rules governing the implementation of public policy,
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Therefore, it is likely that the costs of administering the new regulations
would decrease substantially if individuals could police each other.66 In-
stead of public investment of large sums of money in a bureaucracy that
is ill-equipped to detect and prosecute offenders, the costs of pursuing
civil violations and claims should fall to private individuals who suffer
direct injury. Some may argue that placing the burden on private citizens
to protect their rights may make it too expensive for many to protect
themselves.67 However, by allowing private suits, the DOJ and OCR
could devote more resources to prosecuting those violations where pri-
vate citizens lack the necessary resources or incentives to protect their
rights.68
By allowing private citizen suits, the efficiency and effectiveness of
HIPAA enforcement would likely increase. The cost of most of the liti-
gation would be born by the party most interested in the outcome, and
the sole remaining governmental task would be investigation and en-
forcement of those violations where the victims lack sufficient resources
or incentives to defend their rights.
B. Limiting Penalties to Healthcare Providers Is Contrary
to the Plain Language of the Act and Improperly
Immunizes Third Parties from Liability
There are also two problems that arise from the government's deci-
sion to exempt third parties from liability and limit enforcement of the
privacy provision to healthcare providers.' First, the decision by HHS to
limit enforcement is the result of the OLC's opinion, which contravenes
the plain language of the Act. Second, limiting liability to healthcare
providers frustrates key public policies such as identity theft prevention
and proportional punishment.
1. The OLC Opinion Interprets § 1320d-6 Too Narrowly
The OLC's opinion argues that the language of § 1320d-6 exempts
third parties from liability. 69 The authors of the opinion rely on a pur-
portedly plain language interpretation of the statute.70 However, a tradi-
tional plain language approach requires a balance of potential meanings
since its incentives are purely economic and are structured to reflect the social costs and benefits of
implementation."); Thompson, supra note 60, at 190 (arguing that environmental violations are
difficult and expensive for the government to detect).
66. Stephenson, supra note 63, at 109.
67. KAGAN, supra note 58, at 122-23.
68. Stephenson, supra note 63, at 109.
69. See OLC OPINION, supra note 47.
70. Id at 5-6.
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as they relate to the document as a whole, not the narrowest possible
construction.7' According to Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a
prominent advocate of plain language interpretation, the meaning of lan-
guage should be "that which an ordinary speaker ... would draw from
the statutory text. ' 72 Justice Scalia also argues that the meaning of lan-
guage must be "drawn from the context in which it is used., 73 Applying
Justice Scalia's plain language approach 74 to four of the points raised in
the OLC opinion weighs in favor of applying the privacy provision to
third parties.
First, the opinion asserts that, because the standards for maintaining
and transmitting protected health information apply only to healthcare
providers, 75 only healthcare providers may directly violate those stan-
dards. 76 However, Congress did not use any language in § 1320d-6 that
indicates that it was meant to apply only in the narrow circumstance of
non-compliance with transmission standards. 77 Instead, the section fo-
cuses on the disclosure of individually identifiable health information,
with no mention of transmission standards. 78 The context therefore sug-
gests that § 1320d-6 is not about technical compliance with standards,
71. Maxine D. Goodman, Reconstructing the Plain Language Rule of Statutory Construction:
How and Why, 65 MONT. L. REV. 229, 234 (2004).
72. Id; accord William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the
Law byAntonin Scalia, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1511 (1998).
73. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (holding, on principles of plain language
interpretation, that the statute at issue in the case was unambiguous).
74. Although Justice Scalia's approach to plain language analysis is not universal, it represents
the most stringent methodology for statutory interpretation. Other approaches, such as that of promi-
nent plain language advocate William Blackstone, would also support a reading of the statute that
does not exempt third parties from liability. See Goodman, supra note 71, at 236 ("[Scalia and
Blackstone] part ways dramatically, however, regarding the Court's proper role in construing a stat-
ute. When words are dubious, Blackstone directed the judge to consider the 'reason and spirit' of the
law ... Justice Scalia staunchly disagrees"). The spirit and reason behind the HIPAA statute weigh
in favor of applying the privacy provision to third parties.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1 (a) (2000). The statute provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) Applicability
Any Standard adopted under this part shall apply, in whole or in part, to the following
persons:
(1) A health plan.
(2) A health plan clearinghouse.
(3) A healthcare provider who transmits any health information in electronic
form in connection with a transaction referred to in section 1320d-2(a)(l) of
this title.
76. OLC OPINION, supra note 47, at 5. Specifically, the opinion posits that persons who are
subject to punishment under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 are only those who use, obtain, or disclose pro-
tected information in "violation of this part." "This part" refers to the Act in its entirety and 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-l(a) makes the relevant standards applicable only to covered entities. Thus, the
argument goes, only covered entities may directly violate those standards in "this part."
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2000).
78. Id.
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but about the wrongful use, obtainment, or disclosure of health informa-
tion. Reading the provision in the context of the entire section suggests
that focusing solely on compliance, at the expense of wrongful disclosure
in general, is too narrow a construction.
Next, the opinion states that although the Act penalizes those who
wrongfully obtain protected information, the inclusion of the word "ob-
tain" does not suggest that administrators may penalize anyone who ob-
tains protected information.79 Instead, the opinion states that the language
"merely reflects the fact that the statute and regulations limit the acquisi-
tion, as well as disclosure and use, of information by covered entities.
8°
This interpretation effectively limits penalties for obtaining informa-
tion--only "covered entities" may be penalized. 8' To reach this conclu-
sion, one must necessarily assume the validity of the opinion's first
assertion (that is, only a covered entity may violate the Act). Again, there
is no language in § 1320d-6 indicating that Congress intended to restrict
and penalize healthcare providers only for illegally obtaining protected
information. 82
The third issue addressed by the opinion is whether the different
phrasing in § 1320d-5 (civil penalties) and § 1320d-6 (criminal penalties)
supports a broader reading of § 1320d-6.83 The civil penalty provision
provides for penalties for a person "who violates a provision of this
part., 8 4 The criminal penalty provision makes it a crime to do certain acts
"in violation of this part. 8 5 The opinion states that the difference merely
reflects a necessary "grammatical accommodation," resulting from the
interchange between present and past tense, 86 but concedes in a footnote
that it could render the statute "ambiguous. 8 7 However, an ambiguous
result is not necessary. A broad reading of the language "in violation of'
suggests that any person who causes a violation (that is, induces a
healthcare provider to release information) is liable.88 Conversely, the
79. OLC OPINION, supra note 47, at 6.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(1)(b) (2000) (penalizing a person who "obtains individually identifi-
able health information relating to another person.").
83. OLC OPINION, supra note 47, at 6-7.
84.42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2000).
85. Id. § 1320d-6.
86. OLC OPINION, supra note 47, at 7.
87. Id. at 7 n.5.
88. This is because obtaining information without complying with the standards necessarily
causes a violation of "this part." If the third party is obtaining it wrongfully, then the covered entity
is not in compliance with the standards. See Winn, supra note 47, at 23, who argues that, read more
broadly, HIPAA's criminal provision should
cover any person who "caused" a violation of "this part..." [including] any persons in or
outside of the chain of trust who caused an improper disclosure of PHI. This broad read-
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language "a person who violates" indicates that HHS may only impose a
penalty on a person who directly violates a standard and not someone
who merely causes a standard to be violated. The difference in phrasing
is also reflected in the different titling of the sections. Section 1320d-5 is
titled "General penalty for failure to comply with requirements and stan-
dards."8 9 In contrast, § 1320d-6 is titled "Wrongful disclosure of indi-
vidually identifiable health information." 90 By including a provision that
provides penalties solely for failure to comply with standards and a sepa-
rate provision with no such qualification, Congress likely intended the
latter provision to have a broader interpretation. 91 Accordingly, a reading
of the two provisions in conjunction suggests that § 1320d-5 should
apply solely to healthcare providers while § 1320d-6 should apply to
anyone who wrongfully causes a disclosure to occur.
The final issue addressed by the opinion is the definition of the
92word "person" found in § 1320d-6. For clarity, the pertinent language
of § 1320d-6 provides as follows:
(a) Offense
A person who knowingly and in violation of this part-
(3) discloses individually identifiable health information to another
person;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
93
The plain language of subpart (a) of the provision suggests that any
"person" may be prosecuted if they act "knowingly and in violation of
this part., 94 Although the opinion ultimately concludes that only covered
entities may violate the Act, the opinion concedes that "person" in sub-
part (a), cannot mean "covered entity" because such a reading would
create a conflict with subpart (a)(3).95 The conflict arises because subpart
ing of the statute is supported by the statutory prohibition on wrongfully "obtaining" PHI,
language which would make little sense if Congress intended the law to be restricted to
covered entities alone.
Id.
89.42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2000).
90. Id. § 1320d-6.
91. See, e.g., State v. Roth, 78 Wash. 2d 711, 715, 479 P.2d 55, 57-58 (1971) ("Where differ-
ent language is used in the same connection in different parts of a statute, it is presumed that a dif-
ferent meaning was intended.").
92. OLC OPINION, supra note 47, at 7.
93.42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a) (2000).
94. Id.
95. OLC OPINION, supra note 47, at 7; see also Dictionary Act, I U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (setting
forth a presumptively broad definition wherever the term is used in the United States Code).
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(a)(3) prohibits unauthorized disclosures to a "person." 96 The "person" in
subpart (a)(3) describes the class of people to whom the "person" in sub-
part (a) is prohibited from disclosing information.97 Therefore, if the Act
defined "person" as synonymous with "covered entity," the Act would
only permit the government to punish covered entities that improperly
disclose information to other covered entities. In the event a covered en-
tity disclosed information to a private individual, it would be free from
punishment because individuals would not be classified as a "person"
under the Act.
To avoid this construction, the opinion argues that "person" is lim-
ited according to the context of its use.98 In the context of the entire lan-
guage of subpart (a), the opinion construes "person" narrowly to include
only those persons that also meet the definition of "covered entities."
99
Conversely, "person" defined in subpart (a)(3) is used broadly. Specifi-
cally, the opinion classifies this second person as "any person." 100 Ulti-
mately, the opinion's grammatical maneuvering cannot conceal the fact
that within the span of a few words, "person" has a specific definition
(covered entity) and a general definition (person), with no indication by
Congress that it intended such a construction.
The OLC's construction of the statute also runs counter to the pre-
sumption that the same words used twice in the same statute have the
same meaning. 10' Furthermore, as Justice Scalia states, "judges should
deviate from the plain language of the text only where textual reading
leads to an absurd result."' 0 2 In this instance, there is no need to reach the
absurd result that Congress intended a plain word like "person" to have
two completely different definitions in the span of a few intervening
words. Accordingly, courts should reject the opinion's construction of
the wrongful disclosure provision because it creates unnecessary
inconsistency. °3 A more practical and appropriate reading of the statute
96.42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(3) (2000).
97. Id.
98. OLC OPINION, supra note 47, at 7.
99. Id. Specifically, the opinion argues that the statute's use of the phrase "in violation or'
following "person" in subpart (a) describes the subset of persons who may be held liable under the
Act. This complex grammatical dissection explaining why Congress included this language in the
Act directly contradicts the opinion's assertion that the usage of the term "in violation of' is simply a
"grammatical accommodation." Id. at 8. If Congress intended to limit a patient's privacy rights by
creating this complex structure, it cannot also be a mere "grammatical accommodation."
100. Id.
101. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (5th ed.
1992).
102. Goodman, supra note 71, at 234-35.
103. SINGER, supra note 101, at § 46.05 ("[E]ach part or section should be construed in con-
nection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.").
[Vol. 30:745
HIPAA and Privacy Standards Under State Law
is as follows: a person who, by his conduct, causes a violation of the
statute to occur, is subject to the penalties in § 1320d-6.
Nothing in the plain language of the Act warrants the narrow inter-
pretation offered in the OLC opinion. Instead, the complex grammatical
deconstruction of the statute seems designed only to arrive at the desired
result: third party immunity from prosecution. Accordingly, courts con-
struing the statute should apply the simple, plain language of the Act.
2. Public Policy Considerations Weigh in
Favor of Applying the Act to Third Parties
In addition to the OLC's unreasonable interpretation of the statute,
the decision to exempt third parties from liability conflicts with the key
public policies of protecting private information and proportionally pun-
ishing wrongdoers. First, the privacy provision was included as part of an
effort to decrease misappropriation of private health information from
identity theft and other fraudulent activity. 10 4 However, the narrow inter-
pretation of the statute has left patients in the same position they were in
prior to the enactment of HIPAA, when they relied solely on state causes
of action in tort and breach of contract.105 Unfortunately, as the available
common law claims are not ideal methods for remedying misappropria-
tion of health information, 10 6 many victims have no legitimate recourse.
Although some states have enacted healthcare information legislation,'
0 7
many rely on ill-fitting statutory schemes or outmoded common law al-
ternatives for remedies against third parties who fraudulently obtain con-
fidential information.'0 8 These alternatives have proven to be ineffective
resources in combating the problem of improper health information
disclosures. 109
Second, the OLC's narrow interpretation of the statute does not
comport with general principles of proportionality. Doctors and medical
providers bear a disproportionate share of fault for improper disclosures.
104. Symposium, supra note 17, at 8.
105. Stewart, supra note 32, at 29.
106. See generally Moses, supra note 15, at 526-31.
107. See generally Health Privacy Project, The State of Health Privacy (2002),
http://www.healthprivacy.org/info-urlnocat2304/info-urlnocat-search.htm (containing a compre-
hensive guide to state privacy laws).
108. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.255 (1987); see also Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wash. 2d
195, 961 P.2d 333 (1998); Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 143 Wash. 2d 687, 24 P.3d 390 (2001), revd on
other grounds, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 15, at § 7.3(b) ("A
state-by-state
approach to regulation of medical information does not reflect the realities of modem health care
finance and provision.") (quoting Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Privacy and Security of Personal
Health Information in a New Health Care System, 270 JAMA 2487, 2489-90 (1993)).
109. See discussion infra part IV.B.
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Patients filing complaints with the OCR will be surprised to learn that
only their physician is accountable." Americans trust their doctors and
probably would not file a complaint and risk jeopardizing their doctor-
patient relationship."' From the physician's perspective, the system
heightens transaction costs because medical providers are not always in
the best position to prevent illicit transfers." 
2
In addition, the system does not comport with this nation's legal
framework of tortious and criminal liability. In general, tort and criminal
law punishes unintentional, negligent conduct less harshly than inten-
tional, purposeful conduct. 13 In most cases where third parties fraudu-
lently obtain medical records, either by misrepresentation or by deceit,
the medical provider is an unwitting party to the transaction. By limiting
penalties solely to medical providers, the system punishes the innocent or
negligent actor while the purposeful actor escapes free of liability. The
system punishes relatively minor offenses and effectively shields the true
perpetrators from criminal prosecution.
Currently, due to the narrow interpretation of the wrongful disclo-
sure provision, enforcement of the HIPAA privacy provision leaves
patients and consumers without redress for the intentionally tortious con-
duct of third parties." 14 Contrary to the position stated by the OLC, the
plain language of the provision, when considered in the context of the
entire Act, and in light of the relevant policy considerations, favors an
interpretation that applies the provision to third parties.
A court confronted with the issue of whether an individual may
maintain an action against a third party for wrongfully obtaining infor-
mation, or causing such information to be disclosed, should keep in mind
the universally accepted notion of judicial review expressed by Chief
Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.115 Courts are not
110. It is unlikely that most Americans understand that third parties cannot be held liable for
intrusions into patient medical histories. For example, at least one study has shown that most patients
are unaware of their rights with respect to their medical records. See BISHOP ET AL., supra note 9,
at I ("Although two thirds of national respondents say they are aware of federal protections for their
personal medical records and 59 percent recall receiving a privacy notice, only 27 percent believe
they have more rights than they had before receiving the notice.").
11. Id. at 2 (finding that ninety-eight percent of consumers are willing to share their personal
information with a doctor to advance healthcare).
112. See Kapushion, supra note 26, at 1488 (stating that relaxing privacy standards would
reduce transaction costs among privacy providers).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901, cmt. c (1979); see also MODEL PENAL
CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmts. 1-4 (1985).
114. See Winn, supra note 47, at 23.
115. 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is.").
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constrained by the administrative interpretation of the statute, 1 6 and thus
they should apply the provision to third parties despite the OLC's reluc-
tance to do so. When contemplating such a change, courts should also
remember that "[e]very right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and
every injury its proper redress."' 7 Judicial open-mindedness into possi-
ble alternative enforcement mechanisms is critical to adopting a new
strategy.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DIFFERENT FAILED
METHODS FOR CIRCUMVENTING ADMINISTRATIVE
LIMITATIONS BY PRIVATE LAWSUITS
Although beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to un-
derstand the depth and variety of measures that individuals have utilized
in seeking to secure a remedy for the improper disclosure of protected
health information. The sheer magnitude of cases brought and alternative
measures utilized indicates the ineffectiveness of the current system and
the need for change. Analyzing the cases is also useful because they
demonstrate which elements of the different causes of action are effec-
tive or not. Accordingly, the different cases in which plaintiffs seek re-
dress for the wrongful disclosure of medical information have generally
fallen into three distinct categories. First are cases brought under statu-
tory law, most of which have been brought directly under the HIPAA
statute. 118 Second are cases in which patients have relied on traditional
state common law tort principles." 9 Finally, in some cases courts have
used their inherent equitable powers to provide a remedy in the absence
of explicit statutory provisions.
A. Plaintiffs Asserting a Cause ofAction
Directly Under the HIPAA Statute
Courts have soundly rejected all suits asserting a cause of action di-
rectly under HIPAA. 120 In University of Colorado Hospital v. Denver
116. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) ("The traditional deference courts
pay to agency interpretation [of a statute] is not to be applied to alter the clearly expressed intent of
Congress."); see also Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992) (holding
that a court should not give deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute if it is in conflict with
the plain language of the statute).
117. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 147.
118. See O'Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyo., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (D. Wyo. 2001);
Brock v. Provident Am. Ins. Co., 144 F. Supp. 2d 652, 657 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Means v. Ind. Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 963 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
119. See Winn, supra note 26, at 652-65 (discussing cases in which Plaintiffs have utilized
different causes of action); see also Moses, supra note 15, at 526-31 (discussing cases in which
Plaintiffs have utilized different causes of action).
120. See cases cited supra note 118.
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Publishing Co., 2 ' a hospital filed suit under HIPAA to enjoin a newspa-
per from publishing confidential patient information. 122 The hospital ar-
gued that although the HIPAA statute contained no express authorization
for a private right of action, the court should take a broader view and
read the statute in light of the "contemporary legal context" existing at
the time the statute was passed. 23 Using this context, the court, in accor-
dance with Supreme Court precedent,' 24 could imply a private right of
action despite the lack of express congressional authorization. 1
25
However, the court rejected the hospital's argument, relying on
principles set forth in Alexander v. Sandoval.126 In that case, the Supreme
Court held that "private rights of action to enforce federal law must be
created by Congress.' 27 Sandoval requires courts to first look at the
statutory text for "rights-creating language."' 28 Language that explicitly
confers a right on a specific class of persons indicates that Congress
probably intended to include a right of action, while language customar-
ily found in criminal statutes suggests the opposite. 129 In addition, where
the statutory structure in question provides a discernable enforcement
mechanism, courts should not imply a private right of action.' 30 Based on
this reasoning, the court in University of Colorado Hospital stated that
the language in the HIPAA statute did not focus on the rights of
individuals, but on regulating persons who might have access to the
information, suggesting it should not imply a private right of action.'
31
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the civil fines and criminal penalties
in the statute were a sufficient alternative enforcement mechanism to
suggest Congress did not intend to create a private right of action.
32
121. 340 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (2004).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1145.
124. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979).
125. Denver Publ'g, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
126. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). Suing under a federal statute prohibiting discrimination, Plaintiff
alleged that Alabama's Department of public safety unfairly discriminated when it administered its
driver's licensing tests in English only. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Congress had not
authorized a private right of action under the statute. See id.
127. Id. at 286.
128. Id. at 276.
129. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 691 n.13 (1979) ("[T]he court has been espe-
cially reluctant to imply causes of actions under statutes that create duties on the part of persons for
the benefit of the public.") (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) ("unlawful" con-
duct); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (duty of SIPC to "discharge its
obligations"); Nat'l R.R. Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (forbidding
"action, practice, or policy inconsistent" with the Amtrak Act)).
130. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 289.
131. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. v. Denver Publ'g Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1145 (2004).
132. Id.
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Reliance on the Sandoval test has resulted in uniform rejection of
private causes of action under HIPAA, with many cases citing the same
problems as the court in University of Colorado Hospital.133 To a lesser
extent, a host of state and federal statutes have provided fodder for litiga-
tion as plaintiffs have sought redress for wrongful disclosures. 
134
B. Plaintiffs Asserting a Cause ofAction Under State Common Law
The second category of cases seeking redress for the wrongful dis-
closure of medical information are those in which patients have relied on
traditional common law causes of action. 135 Although under the Suprem-
acy Clause of the Constitution 136 the HIPAA statute preempts state
law, 137 the Act contains an exception for state laws that impose higher
standards than those contained in the regulations promulgated by HHS.1
38
Ostensibly, this exception left open the possibility for private actions
under state tort law. 139 Although the quantity of potential private actions
is immense, this Comment discusses only those that have generated a
significant amount of litigation and discourse: invasion of privacy, inflic-
tion of emotional distress, negligence, and breach of confidentiality. 4 °
133. See O'Donnell v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyo., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (2001); Brock v.
Provident Am. Ins. Co., 144 F. Supp. 2d 652, 657 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Means v. Ind. Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 963 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (M.D. Ala.1997).
134. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.084 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE § 70.02.170 (1991);
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.255 (1987); Jeckle v. Crotty, 120 Wash. App. 374, 85 P.3d 931 (2004);
Fierstein v. DePaul Health Ctr., 949 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
135. See Winn, supra note 26.
136. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause reads as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(l) (2000). The statute provides in relevant part, "Except as pro-
vided in paragraph (2), a provision or requirement under this part, or a standard or implementation
specification adopted .. . shall supersede any contrary provision of State law." Id.
138. Pub. L. 104-191, § 264(c)(1), 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2
(2000)). The relevant portion of the statute provides as follows:
(c) Regulations.-
(2) Preemption.-A regulation promulgated [under this Act] shall not super-
sede a contrary provision of State law, if the provision of State law imposes
requirements, standards, or implementation specifications that are more strin-
gent than the requirements, standards, or implementation specifications im-
posed under the regulation.
Id.
139. HHS has acknowledge this possibility and refused to eliminate it. See OLC OPINION,
supra note 47, at 10 n.12 ("We note that conduct punishable under section 1320d-6 may also be
punishable under state law and render a person liable in tort.").
140. Moses, supra note 15, at 526-31.
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Each cause of action has proved inadequate to the task of protecting
medical privacy.
First, the tort of invasion of privacy makes a person liable for the
damages caused by publicly disclosing information about the private life
of another, which is not of legitimate concern to the public, and which
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 41 To satisfy the re-
quirement of publicity, the defendant must communicate the information
to the public at large, or to so many people that the matter is substantially
certain to become public knowledge. 142 In many improper medical dis-
closure cases, although the information disclosed is not generally avail-
able to the public, the disclosure itself is nonetheless extremely injuri-
ous. t 43  In those cases, despite potentially significant harm, the victim
will be unable to sue third parties who obtain their private information.
Second, infliction of emotional distress makes a person liable for
intentionally or recklessly disclosing private information, by extreme and
outrageous conduct, thereby causing severe emotional distress., 44 In
cases of improper disclosure of medical information, this cause of action
also provides a remedy against third parties who obtain information since
the act of obtaining the information may cause emotional distress.145
However, the burden of proving that the conduct was extreme and outra-
geous is often difficult to overcome.
146
Third, under principles of negligence, improper disclosure of medi-
cal records may lead to liability if the conduct resulting in the disclosure
falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm. 147 Legislative enactment or adminis-
trative regulation may establish standards of reasonable conduct. 48 Thus,
in cases where patients sue based on a theory of negligence, the plaintiffs
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(D) (1979).
142. Id. § 652(D) cmt. a.
143. The two news stories discussed at the beginning of this article fall into this category. See
supra notes 2-5
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1979).
145. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. b (1979):
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one
in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse
his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!'
See also Moses, supra note 15 at 529-30 (citing Sanders v. Spector, 673 So. 2d 1176, 1180 (La. Ct.
App. 1996) ("The premature disclosure of medical records herein does not constitute such extreme
and outrageous conduct. Nor is it conduct calculated to cause and causing mental and physical
harm.")).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1979).
148. Id. § 285.
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allege that the statute defines the standard of reasonable care, and the
defendant did not meet that standard.1 49 Unfortunately, negligence theory
does not apply to the intentional conduct of third parties who obtain or
facilitate the disclosure of information because only the healthcare pro-
vider owes a duty of care to the patient. 150 The third party therefore has
no duty of care to the plaintiff and cannot be held accountable.
Finally, plaintiffs alleging breach of confidentiality must show that
a confidential relationship exists between the parties, and that for reasons
of public policy, the party receiving the information has a duty to main-
tain the privacy of such information. 151 In this arena, courts have placed
special emphasis on the doctor-patient relationship, citing the potential
for abuse. 152 Additionally, the administration of effective healthcare pol-
icy requires a trusting relationship between patients and physicians.
153
However, to sustain a claim of breach of confidentiality, courts require a
direct confidential relationship between the parties. 1
54
At least one scholar has proposed that courts extend liability for
breach of confidence claims to third parties. 155 Federal Prosecutor Peter
Winn argues that courts have already embraced the idea that confidential
relationships extend to third parties who lack a direct relationship with
the patient.156 Based on the holdings in several cases, 157 Winn articulated
a rule for when a patient may maintain a cause of action against a third
party who induces a physician to breach his fiduciary relationship. The
patient has met his burden if the following elements are met:
(1) the third party knew or reasonably should have known of the
existence of the physician-patient relationship; (2) the third party
149. Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wash. 2d 91, 26 P.3d 257 (2001) (holding that plaintiff could
maintain a cause of action against her physician under Washington medical malpractice statute for
the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information).
150. See, e.g., Moses, supra note 15, at 526-31. This seems to be the logical extension of
HHS's reasoning in the OLC opinion. Under the OLC's analysis, Congress intended that the Act
should only apply to covered entities. Although not explicitly stated, the fact that third parties owe
no duty of care to a patient fits in well with this analysis. See OLC OPINION, supra note 47.
151. Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1426, 1451 (1982).
152. See Roe v. Doe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1977) (holding that patient could main-
tain a cause of action against her physician for breach of confidentiality when psychiatrist published
a book containing descriptions of the patient's thoughts, emotions, intimate fantasies and biographi-
cal details).
153. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 307
(5th ed. 2001).
154. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 512
(1995).
155. See Winn, supra note 26.
156. Winn, supra note 26, at 664-65.
157. See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Alberts v.
Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113 (Mass. 1985); Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999).
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intended to induce the physician to wrongfully disclose informa-
tion about the patient, or the third party should have reasonably
anticipated that his actions would induce the physician to wrong-
fully disclose such information; (3) the third party did not
reasonably believe that the physician could disclose that
information to the third party without violating the duty of confi-
dentiality that the physician owed the patient; and (4) the
physician wrongfully divulges confidential information to the
third party.
1 58
Under this test, a third party inducing a healthcare provider to dis-
close confidential information is not immune from liability despite the
lack of a direct confidential relationship. Winn also argues that state
common law offers more protections than the HIPAA statute, and that
federal law does not preempt any private cause of action.159 Unfortu-
nately, few courts have embraced breach of confidentiality as a theory of
liability in medical records disclosure cases.160 It is possible that courts
have refused to adopt this line of reasoning because of their reluctance to
make third parties liable for breach of confidentiality when there is no
direct relationship between the parties.
C. Judicial Reluctance to Exercise Equitable Powers
Finally, courts have traditionally stepped in to provide remedies to
individuals when statutory law leaves them without legitimate re-
course. 161 This trend has ancient roots in the English common law system
of judicial power, adopted by American courts after the revolution.'
62
American courts have traditionally used their equitable powers to pro-
vide justice when the legislature or governing authority is slow to
respond to changes in society. 163 Health information privacy is simply
the most recent phenomenon requiring judicial intervention.
158. Winn, supra note 26, at 664-65.
159. Id. at 668.
160. See cases cited supra note 157.
161. See generally John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173, 208 (1999)
(explaining the English tradition of substantive rights created through equity).
162. Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 347,
373 (2003).
163. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, to Samuel
Kercheval (July 12, 1810):
I am not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws, but laws and institutions
must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more devel-
oped, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners
and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also,
and keep pace with the times.
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However, when the judicial branch applies its equitable powers,
courts tend to be inconsistent in applying the law.1 64 The resulting incon-
sistency is in direct contravention of one of the main policies behind en-
actment of the HIPAA statute-the creation of a uniform set of standards
and rules to streamline the transfer of data. 65 In addition to the uniform-
ity problem, the trend towards a more conservative judiciary in recent
decades 66 has likely made courts reluctant to exercise their equitable
powers in the area of medical privacy. For these reasons, no court has yet
exercised its authority to protect the medical privacy rights of
individuals.
D. Lessons Garnered from Unsuccessful Lawsuits
The different methods of creating a private cause of action for
wrongful disclosure of health information have had varying degrees of
success. Taken together, the claims based on common law causes of ac-
tion have been significantly more successful than attempts to sue directly
under statutory provisions or appeals to judicial equity. 167 One important
lesson is that any viable solution for enforcing patient privacy rights
must apply the uniform standards created by the HIPAA statute. The
Secretary of HHS recognized this point and recommended that Congress
create a federal private right of action. 168 In his recommendations, the
Secretary acknowledged that the protection of health information was
generally a matter of state law, but at the same time emphasized that the
164. THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA 6
(2006). In 1828, John Forsyth lamented,
[E]ight Judges of the Superior Court, each confined to the circuit for which he was
elected, supreme in his authority, not bound by the decisions of his predecessors or con-
temporaries, and not always by his own, while these will be in their turn disregarded by
his successor, there can neither be uniformity nor certainty in the laws for the security of
the rights of persons or property.
Id., available at http://www.gasupreme.us/pdf/2006_brochure.pdf. Similarly, George W. Crawford,
in 1845, stated, "Eleven Judges, each supreme in his authority and capable of being appealed from
himself only to himself, cannot presume to decide with uniformity. Without uniformity law itself is a
chance and has been aptly called a miserable servitude." Id. at 7.
165. See SPIIHI, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918, 59,920 (proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pts. 160-164).
166. Cass R. Sunstein & David Schkade, A Bench Tilting Right, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2004, at
A 19 ("The federal judiciary has been moving steadily to the right.").
167. See supra Part IV.
168. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, PURSUANT TO SECTION 264 OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996 sec. H (1997), http://aspe.hhs.gov/adrmsimp/pvcrec.htm. "Only if
we put the force of law behind our rhetoric can we expect people to have confidence that their
healthcare information is protected, and ensure that those holding health information will take their
responsibility seriously." Id.
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increasingly interstate nature of the problem, coupled with uneven pro-
tection offered by different states, required greater action.
169
With these considerations in mind, the approach taken by Winn is
instructive because it embraces all of the necessary elements for a suc-
cessful cause of action for wrongful disclosure.' 70 First, it places a duty
on the physician to maintain the confidential relationship. 71 Second, an
individual may maintain a cause of action against third parties who
wrongfully obtain protected health information.' 72 Finally, the standard
for breach of the confidential relationship incorporates the uniformity of
the HIPAA regulations. 73 Although few courts have embraced Winn's
approach, possibly because of the conceptual difficulties of extending the
boundaries of confidential relationships, it provides an excellent starting
point for creating a private cause of action.
V. A NEW METHOD: INCORPORATING THE FEDERAL HIPAA
PRIVACY STANDARDS INTO THE STATE COMMON LAW
CLAIM OF INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION
As Winn's approach successfully integrates the uniform standards
of the HIPAA statute with a common law cause of action, it is the start-
ing point for further analysis. This section will articulate an alternate
cause of action and method of integration, which, although similar to
Winn's, creates an alternate foundation upon which state courts may act.
Specifically, Washington State courts should allow patients to sue third
parties for violations of the HIPAA statute within the procedural frame-
work of Washington Mutual v. Superior Court,174 a California Court of
Appeal case.
A. Washington Recognizes the Tort of Intrusion Upon Seclusion and
Would Likely Apply it in Cases of Unauthorized Medical Disclosures
One significant problem with Winn's theory of liability for breach
of confidentiality is that courts appear reluctant to extend the concept to
third parties because there is no direct confidential relationship. 75 The
best way to address this shortcoming is to eliminate the need for a confi-
dential relationship and rely solely on the disclosure of confidential
information. The tort of intrusion upon seclusion satisfies these
169. Id. The Secretary described the current state of the law as "a morass of erratic law, both
statutory and judicial, defining confidentiality ofhealthcare information." Id.
170. Winn, supra note 26.
171. Id. at 654.
172. Id. at 664-65.
173. Id. at 668.
174. Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 4th 773 (1999).
175. See cases cited supra note 157.
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requirements. 176 Under a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, a defendant
is liable for intentional intrusions upon the private affairs of another
when: 1) the plaintiff had a legitimate and reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy; and 2) the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son.177 The tort is very similar to invasion of privacy, but without the ad-
ditional requirement of publicity. 78  The commentators in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts did not specifically discuss the applica-
tion of intrusion upon seclusion to cases of improper disclosure of medi-
cal records, but the comments to the section indicate that such a disclo-
sure would be actionable.' 79 As an added benefit, the Washington su-
preme court has recognized the tort as a valid cause of action. 1so
A court in Washington would likely consider the unauthorized dis-
closure of medical information sufficient grounds for a plaintiff to claim
intrusion into her personal affairs. Patients have a legitimate expectation
of privacy for their medical records, and most improper disclosures
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. As compared with
prior applications of intrusion claims by Washington courts, the case for
utilizing intrusion claims in medical disclosure cases is particularly
strong.
For example, the supreme court recently addressed a claim for in-
trusion in Doe v. Gonzaga University.181 In that case, the school admini-
stration at Gonzaga University investigated a student accused of rape.
After the investigation, the school denied the student an affidavit he
needed to receive his teaching certificate. 82 Thereafter, the student sued
the University by claiming, among other things, an intrusion into his pri-
vate affairs.1 83 The court permitted the plaintiff to proceed when he pro-
vided evidence that the University "inquired into his personal relation-
ships, habits, and even anatomy."' 84 Although the court acknowledged
that the school had statutory authority to contact faculty regarding
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(B) (1979).
177. Id.
178. Id. at cmt. a.
179. Id. at cmt. b. Comment b states the following:
[The intrusion] may also be by the use of the defendant's senses, with or without me-
chanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff's private affairs, as by looking into his
upstairs windows with binoculars or tapping his telephone wires. It may be by some other
form of investigation or examination into his private concerns.
180. Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wash. 2d 195, 206, 961 P.2d 333, 339-40 (1998).
181. Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 143 Wash. 2d 687, 693, 24 P.3d 390, 393 (2001), rev'don other
grounds, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
182. Id. at 697, 24 P.3d at 395.
183. Id. at 698, 24 P.3d at 395-96.
184. Id. at 706, 24 P.3d at 399.
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serious behavioral problems, the student had a reasonable expectation of
privacy as to the "intimate details of [his] sex life.' ' 5
In the context of medical records disclosure cases, plaintiffs have an
even stronger claim to an expectation of privacy. First, in Gonzaga Uni-
versity, state regulations authorized the University to investigate the
student's potential behavioral problems.18 6 Conversely, Washington's
Uniform Health Care Information Act (UHCIA) 8 7 states that medical
records are "personal and sensitive" 1 88 and expressly prohibits disclosure
without patient authorization.189 As such, parties who have wrongfully
obtained confidential medical records are not relying on any express
legal authorization.190
Second, the University confined its investigation into the student's
behavioral problems to matters on the public record. 191 Although the
University was authorized to contact faculty under whom the student had
studied, 92 'any behavioral problems cropping up in the course of the stu-
dent's studies would have been apparent to other students in the
classroom. Consequently, the court permitted the student to make a claim
for intrusion even though the student had a relatively weak expectation
of privacy. Conversely, patients have high expectations for the privacy of
their medical records.' 93 Unlike the student-teacher relationship, the
physician-patient relationship includes a certain measure of confidential-
185. Id. It is likely that a court would associate medical records with "intimate details" of a
plaintiff's personal life. For example, the details of an individual's sex life reside with two people,
the individual and his or her sexual partner. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)
(holding that the government may not intervene in private sexual conduct between consenting
adults). Similarly, medical records are the product of a two-person relationship: doctor-patient.
186. Gonzaga Univ., 143 Wash. 2d at 706, 24 P.3d at 399; see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE §
180-75-082 (1989) (repealed by WASH. REV. CODE § 97.04.088 on March 8, 1997).
187. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.02.005-.904 (1991).
188. Id. § 70.02.005.
189. The Act contains provisions for disclosure without express authorization in certain speci-
fied cases. See id. § 70.02.050.
190. Id.
191. Gonzaga Univ., 143 Wash. 2d at 706, 24 P.3d at 399. See also Mark v. Seattle Times, 96
Wash. 2d 473, 497, 635 P.2d 1081, 1094 (1981).
It is clear also that the thing into which there is intrusion or prying must be, and be enti-
tled to be, private .... On the public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has
no legal right to be alone; and it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than follow
him about and watch him there.
Id. (citing W. PROSSER, TORTS 808-09 (4th ed. 1971); Lamon v. City of Westport, 44 Wash. App.
664, 669, 723 P.2d 470, 474 (1986) (holding that plaintiffs could not maintain an action for an intru-
sion into their private affairs because the issue was a matter of public record).
192. Gonzaga Univ., 143 Wash. 2d at 706, 24 P.3d at 399.
193. See BISHOP ET AL., supra note 9 ("Sixty-seven percent of national respondents [are]
'somewhat' or 'very concerned' about the privacy of their personal medical records.").
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ity.194 Doctors do not disclose the content of their discussions with pa-
tients, nor do they conduct meetings with their patients in the presence of
third parties, like teachers do in a classroom setting.' 95 Doctors, like other
professions that rely on this aspect of confidentiality, 196 meet with
patients individually behind closed doors, and often discuss sensitive
issues. 197
Doe v. Gonzaga University illustrates that prior intrusion claims
considered by Washington courts have set a relatively low bar for plain-
tiffs when it comes to demonstrating an expectation of privacy. Accord-
ingly, in a medical records disclosure case, it is unlikely that a court
would reject a claim of intrusion upon seclusion on the grounds that the
plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Finally, wrongful disclosure of medical records would be highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person. Americans rate the privacy of their medi-
cal information as a serious concern.' 98 In many cases, the potential for
embarrassment resulting from the improper disclosure of medical records
is high. 199 Patients may also face problems with their employers or others
if their confidential information is disseminated. 200 Even though some
mistaken disclosures will be harmless, most disclosures that lead to liti-
gation are probably those tending to be egregious or overly offensive to a
reasonable person.20'
Although some critics have argued that the tort of intrusion is insuf-
ficient to protect medical privacy, 202 today patients can claim an
194. See generally Brett G. Scharffs & John W. Welch, An Analytical Framework for Under-
standing and Evaluating the Fiduciary Duties of Educators, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159, 179
(2005).
195. Id.
196. Attorneys, clergy, and counselors to name a few.
197. Scharffs & Welch, supra note 194.
198. See BISHOP ET AL., supra note 9.
199. Ralph Ruebner & Leslie Ann Reis, Hippocrates to HIPAA: A Foundation for a Federal
Physician-Patient Privilege, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 505, 510 n.28 (2004). "Unauthorized disclosure of an
individual's medical information can result in injury to that individual's reputation, embarrassment,
loss of employment, loss of financial opportunities, including loans, harassment, and even violence."
Id. (citing AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY ch. 5 (1999)).
200. Id
201. For example, consider the facts of Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 143 Wash.2d 687, 24 P.3d 390
(2001), and the victims in the articles cited supra notes 2 & 5.
202. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 15, at § 6.5. Other critics argue that intrusion
claims are insufficient to protect patient privacy because the rule does not protect plaintiffs who take
offense when a reasonable person would not. See Winn, supra note 26, at 658. However, the law has
always distinguished individual sensibilities in favor of the general public concern:
Complete privacy does not exist in this world except in a desert, and anyone who is not a
hermit must expect and endure the ordinary incidents of the community life in which he
is a part. Thus, he must expect the more or less casual observation of his neighbors as to
what he does.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(D) cmt. c (1979).
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intrusion based on a privacy right derived from HIPAA. For example, in
Miller v. Motorola, an Illinois court rejected a claim for intrusion in a
medical records disclosure case because the plaintiff voluntarily provided
the records to the defendant.2 °3 The court reasoned that because the plain-
tiff had voluntarily disclosed the records to the defendant, there was no
intrusion into her affairs when the defendant subsequently disseminated
the information.20 4 However, Motorola was decided prior to the enact-
ment of HIPAA in 1996.2o5 Today, the plaintiff in Motorola could claim
an intrusion based on the defendant's disclosure of information without
HIPAA authorization.20 6 In addition, as the cases above suggest, courts in
Washington have interpreted intrusion upon seclusion more broadly than
the court in Motorola. °7
B. Washington Mutual v. Superior Court Provides the
Framework for Incorporating Federal Privacy Standards
into a State Claim for Intrusion Upon Seclusion
Although intrusion upon seclusion provides an excellent starting
point, it lacks the uniformity embodied by the standards in HIPAA. Uni-
formity is important because plaintiffs and defendants need to know what
the rules are for the system to function properly.20 8 This Part will discuss
the method used by a California court to integrate the standards of the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)209 with the protections
of a state law cause of action.210 Washington courts should use the
California case to integrate the HIPAA standards into an action for intru-
sion upon seclusion.
In Washington Mutual, the California Court of Appeals addressed
whether a violation of a standard contained in a federal statute could be
the predicate for a private state law cause of action when the federal stat-
ute did not provide for a private right of action.211 The law in question
was RESPA, which provided that lenders must make certain disclosures
203. 560 N.E.2d 900, 904 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that there was no unauthorized intru-
sion into the plaintiff employee's affairs when the defendant employer disseminated her medical
records to co-workers because she voluntarily provided the information to the defendant).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Similarly, a third party who causes a health care provider to improperly disclose informa-
tion in violation of HIPAA would clearly be intruding on a patient's private affairs.
207. See cases cited supra note 191.
208. See generally Thomas 0. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78
WASH. L. REV. 429, 444 (2003) (discussing the necessity of uniform application of the law).
209. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000).
210. Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 4th 773 (1999).
211. Id
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212regarding fees to borrowers prior to entering loan agreements. The
plaintiffs sued Washington Mutual Bank for not disclosing certain addi-
tional fees that it assessed as part of some real estate transactions.1 3 In its
defense, Washington Mutual challenged the validity of the suit, arguing
that the federal RESPA statute preempted any state law claims. 214 A pro-
vision of the statute preempted any state law that was "inconsistent" with
the Act 2 5 and gave the Secretary authority to determine which state laws
were inconsistent with the statute when promulgating regulations. 21 6 One
final portion of that provision prohibited the preemption of state laws
giving consumers greater protection than the federal statute.21 7
The construction of the RESPA statute at issue in that case mirrors
the HIPAA statute in many key respects. As with RESPA, HIPAA does
not permit a private cause of action.21 8 Also, HIPAA contains a provision
that preempts contrary state law, and places discretion in the hands of the
Secretary to decide whether the state law in question is contrary to fed-
eral law. 219 Finally, HIPAA does not preempt state laws giving greater
protection to consumers.
220
In analyzing the RESPA statute, the California court narrowly con-
strued the language of the preemption clause in light of the strong pre-
sumption against preemption.22' Washington Mutual argued that the lack
of an express private federal action indicated Congress' intention to pre-
empt state causes of action.222 The court stated that without congressional
authorization for a private cause of action, preemption of state law would
"have the perverse effect of granting complete immunity [from liabil-
ity]." 223 The court went further, stating, "[i]t is, to say the least, difficult
to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of
212. 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000).
213. Wash. Mut. Bank, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 776.
214. Id. at 775-76.
215. 12 U.S.C. § 2616 (2000).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(1) (2000). While the differences between "inconsistent" and
"contrary" open this comparison to debate, it is likely that a "contrary" provision is a harder standard
to meet because the provision must be in stark contrast to the Act. An "inconsistent" provision may
only be partially at odds with the federal statute. Such a construction lends support to the argument
presented in this Comment.
220. Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264(c)(1), 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2
(2000)).
221. Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 4th 773, 782 (1999). According to the
court, "[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long pre-
sumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action." Id. (quoting
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
222. Id. at 786-87 n.16.
223. Id. at 783 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996)).
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judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.' ,224 Accordingly,
the court held that the "mere absence of a private right of action in a
federal law" was an insufficient basis for preemption.225
Next, with respect to the express preemption provision in the
RESPA statute, the court analyzed several federal court decisions ad-
dressing this point.2 26 The court held that when the state cause of action
does not frustrate the purpose behind the federal law, the federal law
does not preempt the state cause of action.227 The state law in question
did not frustrate the purpose behind the federal law, but instead was
complimentary because it tended to promote full compliance and disclo-
sure in accordance with RESPA.228
Finally, the court briefly addressed the Secretary's discretion in de-
termining whether federal law preempts a state law because it is incon-
sistent.229 Although citing one case prohibiting application of state law
without Secretary approval,2 3 ° the court noted that commentators had
uniformly criticized the result231 and instead presumed that state law was
consistent with federal law until the Secretary determines that it is
inconsistent.2 3 2 Ultimately, the court held that RESPA did not preempt
private actions under state laws for violations of RESPA because there
was no express preemption and the state actions were consistent and
complimentary with federal law.
233
Applying the foregoing analysis to HIPAA, the result should be
similar. The statute does not preempt private state actions because
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See generally Beffa v. Bank of W., 152 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that an express
preemption contained in the Expedited Funds Availability Act was "quite narrow" and that "Con-
gress expressed no desire to preempt state laws or causes of action that supplement, rather than con-
tradict" federal law); Allarcom Pay Television v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the express preemption provision contained in the Federal Communications Act did not
prevent states from enacting laws that imposed additional, but not contrary, obligations to those
included in the federal law); Total TV v. Palmer Commc'ns, Inc., 69 F.3d 298 (9th Cir. 1995) cert.
denied, 517 U.S. 1152 (1996) (holding that the express preemption provision in the Cable Commu-
nications Policy Act did not preempt a state law because the state law complimented rather than
undermined the federal law).
227. Wash. Mut. Bank, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 785.
228. Id. at 787.
229. Id. at 785.
230. Greenwald v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Boston, 446 F. Supp. 620 (D.Mass. 1978)
(holding that the Secretary must determine that the state law in question gives greater protection
before the law may be applied).
231. See, e.g., BARRON & BERENSON, FEDERAL REGULATION OF REAL ESTATE AND
MORTGAGE LENDING, § 2.03, p. 2-33 n.410 (4th ed. 1998).
232. Wash. Mut. Bank, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 773.
233. Id. at 785 n.14.
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HIPAA is silent on the issue 234 and preemption would place absolute
immunity on third parties who wrongfully obtain protected health infor-
mation. Although some courts and the OLC have argued that the admin-
istrative complaint process provides a sufficient alternative enforcement
mechanism, the lack of tangible results suggests otherwise.235 In addition,
providing individuals a forum to address their grievances would compli-
ment, not frustrate, the HIPAA statute. Medical providers would have
added incentive to comply with the requirements of the statute out of fear
of private lawsuits, and the threat of a lawsuit would deter third parties
contemplating fraudulent activity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Administrative action to protect the privacy of health information
has been extremely inadequate. The law currently allows medical pro-
viders to disclose confidential information without genuine fear of repri-
sals, and third parties may deceive, scam, connive, and weasel private
medical information with impunity. It is shameful to admit, but over ten
years after the enactment of HIPAA there have been no monetary penal-
ties imposed,236 and only two guilty pleas have been entered. 7 Without
further congressional action, the task falls to the courts and to the states
to provide remedies to patients injured by the conduct of others.
A state cause of action may incorporate the standards for protecting
health information found in HIPAA. Applying the analytical framework
in Washington Mutual v. Superior Court, a Washington court could con-
clude that HIPAA's express preemption provision does not prevent pri-
vate causes of action under state law for violations of HIPAA. A state
court may also exercise its power of judicial review to interpret the
meaning of the statute more broadly. The interpretation offered by the
Secretary is unnecessarily narrow and internally inconsistent with the
Act viewed in its entirety. A broader interpretation of the privacy
provision would be consistent with the plain language of the statute and
would provide plaintiffs redress for the injuries they have suffered at the
hands of third parties. A plaintiff passing these threshold tests may sue a
medical provider or third party for violations of the common law tort
doctrine of intrusion upon seclusion, which the Washington Supreme
Court recognized in Doe v. Gonzaga University. The doctrine of intru-
sion upon seclusion eliminates the need to convince a court that a third
party may breach a duty of confidentiality to a patient, and as the
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7 (2000).
235. See supra Part IIl.
236. See sources cited supra note 42.
237. See sources cited supra notes 45-46.
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doctrine is part of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it is generally
available to any state for adoption.
Problems with information privacy have become exponentially
more pronounced in the last decade. The privacy protections in HIPAA
have proven insufficient to protect patient's rights. The time for
congressional action has come and gone and it is time for courts to
exercise their equitable powers, giving plaintiffs a forum to seek redress
for violation of their rights.
